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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 Before us is a Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed by a 
law firm and its client, a trust company which is a defendant in 
the underlying diversity action involving claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract and negligence, arising 
from the trust company's role in a stock repurchase transaction.  
They jointly seek a writ directing the district court to vacate 
and reverse its orders compelling the law firm to comply with a 
  
subpoena duces tecum requesting its file relating to all work it 
performed for the client regarding the repurchase transaction.   
 They also seek a writ directing the district court to 
vacate and reverse its order denying their request for a 
protective order to enforce the umbrella of confidentiality 
established by a confidentiality agreement stipulated to by the 
parties to the underlying dispute, but which was never embodied 
in an order of the district court.  In that regard, the specific 
issue we must decide is whether general allegations of 
embarrassment and injury to professional reputations and client 
relationships satisfies the "good cause" requirement for the 
issuance of an umbrella protective order pursuant to our recent 
decision in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 
1994).  The law firm and its client assert that they will be 
unable to rectify the harm to their reputations and client 
relationships if the law firm's privileged documents are publicly 
disseminated.   
 We find that although they have established that there 
are no alternative avenues of appeal for these discovery orders, 
the law firm and the client trust company have failed to 
establish their clear and indisputable right to the writ.  They 
failed to establish "good cause" for the protection of all of the 
law firm's file documents pursuant to the confidentiality 
agreement.  Nor have they demonstrated that the district court 
erred in determining that the scope of the client's waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, by injecting the client's reliance on 
  
advice of counsel as an issue in the underlying action, extended 
to the entire transaction, including back-up documents.   
 Accordingly, we decline to issue the requested writs.  
 
  
 I. 
 Glenmede Trust Company ("Glenmede") is a Pennsylvania 
trust company that serves as the trustee for several charitable 
trusts, including the Pew Charitable Trusts.1  Glenmede also 
serves as a trustee for a number of private trusts and acts as an 
investment advisor pursuant to a written contract for other 
clients.  B. Ray Thompson, Jr., several members of his family2 
and the trustees3 of five trusts established by B. Ray Thompson, 
Sr. for the benefit of his five grandchildren (collectively "the 
Thompson Family") were investment advisory clients of Glenmede.  
Prior to September 11, 1990, both the Pew Charitable Trusts and 
the Thompson family held substantial shares of Oryx Energy 
Company stock; the Pew family's Oryx holdings totalled in excess 
of 25 million shares and the Thompson family's Oryx holdings 
totalled approximately 2.9 million shares.  In mid-1990, Glenmede 
broached, with Oryx management, the subject of a direct buy-back 
of Oryx shares held by the Pew Charitable Trusts.  Oryx was 
willing to repurchase a maximum of 18 million shares at a premium 
price per share but requested that buy-back discussions be kept 
                     
1
.   The Pew Charitable Trusts are comprised of the Pew 
Memorial Trust, the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust, the Mabel Pew 
Myrin Trust, the Trust under Paragraph 9 of the Will of J. N. 
Pew, Jr., and the Trust under the Will of Ethel Pew. 
2
.   These include B. Ray Thompson's wife, Juanne J. 
Thompson, and his five children, Adella S. Thompson, Sarah 
Thompson Tarver, Rebekah L. Thompson, Catherine V. Thompson and 
B. Ray Thompson, III. 
3
.   The trustees are B. Ray Thompson, Jr., Juanne J. 
Thompson and Dale A. Keasling. 
  
confidential.  Given the limitations on the buy-back, Glenmede 
consulted its counsel, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, as to whether 
the Oryx transaction could be extended to include Glenmede's 
private trust and investment advisory clients.4  
 Pepper Hamilton issued an Opinion Letter dated 
September 6, 1990 advising Glenmede that the buy-back transaction 
could not be structured to include private clients of Glenmede as 
to do so may violate Internal Revenue Code prohibitions on 
private foundations.5  Pepper Hamilton further advised Glenmede 
that it could not notify its private clients of the buy-back 
negotiations between Oryx and Glenmede acting in its capacity as 
trustee of the Pew Charitable Trusts.  On September 11, 1990, 
Oryx repurchased through Glenmede 18 million of its common shares 
held by the Pew Charitable Trusts and converted the remaining 7.3 
million common shares held by the Pew Charitable Trusts to 
convertible preferred shares.  Allegedly, based on the Opinion 
Letter from Pepper Hamilton, Glenmede excluded its private 
clients with holdings of Oryx stock from the buy-back 
transaction. 
                     
4
.   Pepper Hamilton had a long-standing relationship with 
Glenmede and the Pew family.  It incorporated Glenmede in 1956, 
drafted the trust instruments for the Pew charitable trusts 
administered by Glenmede, and attended all meetings of Glenmede's 
Board of Directors.  A partner of Pepper Hamilton always served 
as the secretary and a board member of Glenmede.     
5
.   The Opinion Letter contained Pepper Hamilton's legal 
"opinion concerning the inclusion of certain private trusts and 
estates in transactions which may be undertaken by the Glenmede 
Trust Company on behalf of the charitable trusts for which it is 
trustee."  
  
 In September of 1992, the Thompson family brought an 
action against Glenmede, its parent Glenmede Corporation, a 
number of Glenmede officers and directors and the Chairman and 
CEO of Oryx, who was dismissed from this action, asserting, inter 
alia, claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of 
contract, and negligence, all allegedly arising from Glenmede's 
role in the September 11, 1990 buy-back transaction, in which 
Oryx repurchased 18 million of its shares from Glenmede as 
trustee of the Pew Charitable Trusts.  Glenmede raised as its 
Fourteenth affirmative defense to these charges that it "was 
advised by counsel that it was legally precluded by Internal 
Revenue Code prohibitions from including Oryx shares held by 
other accounts in the repurchase transaction."   
 Glenmede concedes that the impact of placing at issue 
its reliance on advice of counsel was a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege limited to the subject matter placed at issue.  
Glenmede admitted only to a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege relating to the subject matter of the Opinion Letter, 
which it submits is broader than tax advice which is the primary 
subject of the Opinion Letter, but narrower than the totality of 
the advice rendered regarding the buy-back transaction.6  In 
accordance with its position, Glenmede produced the Pepper 
Hamilton Opinion Letter and a draft Opinion Letter in response to 
discovery requests served by the Thompson family.   
                     
6
.   Glenmede admitted at oral argument that the waiver was 
broader than tax advice but narrower than the entire transaction.  
Glenmede, however, did not offer further specificity regarding 
the scope of its waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 
  
 In response to the Thompson family's concern regarding 
the production of financial records, the parties stipulated to a 
"Confidentiality Order" restricting the disclosure of documents 
to be produced and establishing measures to maintain 
confidentiality pending an appeal from final judgment.  As 
evidenced by the terms of the confidentiality agreement, the 
parties contemplated the wholesale adoption of that agreement by 
the district court.  Although it was filed with the district 
court for approval, it was never endorsed in an order of court.  
Nevertheless, the parties complied with its terms, including the 
filing of pleadings under seal.   
 On July 30, 1993, the Thompson family served a subpoena 
duces tecum on Pepper Hamilton, requesting its entire file 
concerning services performed for Glenmede in connection with the 
buy-back transaction.  Pepper Hamilton and Glenmede objected to 
the production of Pepper Hamilton's file on the basis of the 
attorney-client privilege.  On October 18, 1993, the Thompson 
family filed a motion to compel the production of the file, 
arguing that Glenmede waived the attorney-client privilege 
because it raised reliance on advice of counsel pertaining to the 
buy-back transaction as an affirmative defense to the Thompson 
family's claims.  The Thompson family further contended that 
Glenmede's concern regarding the production of Pepper Hamilton's 
file was unwarranted given the protection afforded by the 
confidentiality agreement to which the parties stipulated.   
 By Memorandum and Order dated December 14, 1993, the 
district court granted the Thompson family's motion to compel, 
  
concluding that Glenmede waived its attorney-client privilege 
concerning all communications, whether written or oral, to or 
from counsel, regarding the buy-back transaction.  The district 
court ordered that Pepper Hamilton produce its entire file for 
services performed on behalf of Glenmede pertaining to the buy-
back transaction, including all back-up documents to the Opinion 
Letter.  Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton moved for reconsideration 
of that Memorandum and Order, challenging the district court's 
conclusion that their invocation of the defense of reliance on 
advice of counsel resulted in a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege encompassing all services Pepper Hamilton performed in 
connection with the buy-back transaction.7  Glenmede asserted 
that its waiver was limited to tax advice embodied in the Opinion 
Letter.  By Memorandum and Order dated April 8, 1994, the 
district court rejected Glenmede's motion for reconsideration on 
the basis that the Opinion Letter discussed a number of issues in 
addition to tax advice, including insider trading and the 
financial ramifications of the transaction.   The district 
court also concluded that Pepper Hamilton's involvement in 
structuring and closing the transaction required the production 
of back-up documents to the Opinion Letter to permit the Thompson 
family to analyze the reasonableness of Glenmede's reliance on 
the advice of counsel.   
                     
7
.   At no time did Pepper Hamilton and/or Glenmede seek an 
in camera inspection of the file documents they sought to 
preclude from discovery. 
  
 Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton did not seek a writ of 
mandamus for immediate relief from the district court's orders 
compelling the production of documents; they opted to defer 
appellate review of the district court's rulings until final 
judgment.  Instead, Pepper Hamilton produced in excess of 13,000 
documents in compliance with the district court's orders.   
 On June 20, 1994, Glenmede and the other defendants 
filed a motion for summary judgment under seal, attaching several 
Pepper Hamilton file documents for which the attorney-client 
privilege had been asserted but deemed waived by the district 
court.  On June 27, 1994, the Thompson family challenged the 
"confidential" designation of the Pepper Hamilton file documents 
and notified Glenmede of their intent to treat them as non-
confidential.8  On July 18, 1994, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton 
moved for a Protective Order objecting to the Thompson family's 
wholesale challenge to the confidentiality of the documents.  The 
                     
8
.   The confidentiality agreement provided a mechanism for 
challenging the designation of documents as "confidential" -- 
provide notification to the producing party of challenge to 
confidentiality, the parties confer in an attempt to resolve the 
challenge and, if no agreement can be reached, seek court 
intervention.  The Thompson family mounted this challenge despite 
their representations to the district court that Glenmede and 
Pepper Hamilton's concerns regarding public disclosure were 
unwarranted in light of the protection afforded by the stipulated 
confidentiality agreement.  Given our expectation that parties 
operate in good faith during discovery, we note that this 
challenge closely followed our decision in Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. May 2, 1994), regarding the 
impropriety of the issuance of broad confidentiality orders, 
which signaled a shift from the previous practice of judicial 
endorsement of such stipulations. 
  
Thompson family cross-moved to unseal the summary judgment 
documents filed under seal by Glenmede and the other defendants.  
 On October 21, 1994, the district court heard arguments 
on the pending motions.9  It directed the parties to negotiate 
the issues raised in the motion for protective order and to 
present a motion for the confidential treatment of particular 
documents or categories of documents.  Glenmede, Pepper Hamilton 
and the Thompson family, however, were unable to reach an 
agreement regarding the confidential status of the Pepper 
Hamilton file documents.  By Memorandum and Order dated November 
22, 1994, the district court granted the Thompson family's motion 
to amend the complaint to assert claims against individual Pepper 
Hamilton attorneys, quoting from a number of the Pepper Hamilton 
file documents.  By Memorandum and Order dated November 29, 1994, 
the district court denied Glenmede and the other defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. 
 On November 30, 1994, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton 
filed an emergency motion to seal court records and for 
protective order, seeking to seal both the district court's 
November 22, 1994 Memorandum and Order and the October 21, 1994 
hearing transcript, pending consideration of their motion for 
protective order to keep the Pepper Hamilton documents 
                     
9
.   The motions included Glenmede and the other defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, Glenmede's motion for protective 
order and the Thompson family's motion to add Pepper Hamilton 
attorneys as defendants on the basis of information culled from 
the Pepper Hamilton file documents, a motion to compel the 
production of documents and a motion to unseal the record.   
  
confidential and for use only in these proceedings.  By 
Memorandum and Order dated December 2, 1994, the district court 
denied Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton's initial motion for 
protective order and granted the Thompson family's motion to 
unseal the record.10  The district court determined that the 
confidentiality agreement did not satisfy Pansy's "good cause" 
requirement nor did Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton establish that 
disclosure of the Pepper Hamilton documents would cause them a 
defined and serious harm.   
 On December 13, 1994, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton 
filed this petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district 
court to vacate and reverse its December 14, 1993 and April 8, 
1994 Memoranda and Orders compelling the production of the Pepper 
Hamilton file documents and its December 2, 1994 order denying 
confidentiality protection for those file documents.  In 
addition, they seek a writ directing the district court:  to 
place under seal its November 22 and 29, 1994 Memoranda and 
Orders, the October 21, 1994 hearing transcript and all briefs 
and pleadings that reference the Pepper Hamilton file documents; 
to remove all references to those Memoranda and Orders from all 
public access computer databases and district court records; and 
to order that the Memoranda and Orders not be published in any 
reporter.  Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton contend that the district 
                     
10
.   The district court did not dispose of Glenmede and 
Pepper Hamilton's emergency motion to seal court records and for 
protective order until January 12, 1995 when it issued a 
Memorandum and Order denying the unopposed motion.  
  
court's denial of the protective order has revealed the Pepper 
Hamilton file documents to the public, which cannot be remedied 
on appeal from final judgment.  The public dissemination of the 
Pepper Hamilton documents is the harm sought to be averted via 
this mandamus petition. 
 
 II. 
 This is an appeal from discovery orders which are not 
appealable as final decisions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Our jurisdiction is premised upon the All Writs Act, 
which provides that the federal courts "may issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."  28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1651(a) (West 1994).  The issuance of the writ must aid some 
present or potential exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  See 
Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Since this diversity action is potentially 
within our appellate jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction to 
consider the petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 Nonetheless, our writ power should be invoked only in 
extraordinary situations, see Kerr v. United States Dist. Court 
for Northern Dist. of California, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976), i.e., 
only in limited circumstances where a party seeking issuance has 
no other adequate means to attain the desired relief and 
establishes that the right to the writ is clear and indisputable.  
  
Haines, 975 F.2d at 89.  Once these prerequisites are met, the 
issuance of the writ is a matter of discretion.  Id.   
 Although mandamus is an appropriate means of immediate 
appellate review of orders compelling the production of documents 
claimed to be protected by privilege or other confidentiality 
interest, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton chose not to seek a writ 
of mandamus to prevent the production of the privileged Pepper 
Hamilton documents, instead relying on the protection afforded by 
the stipulated confidentiality agreement.  See Bogosian v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1985).  We must ascertain 
whether mandamus is an appropriate means of immediate appellate 
review of an order compelling the production of privileged 
documents after those documents have been produced to the 
discovering party.   
 Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton properly exercised their 
right to oppose the production of the privileged documents; 
however, when faced with the choice of seeking immediate relief 
through mandamus or producing the documents pursuant to the 
stipulated confidentiality agreement, Glenmede and Pepper 
Hamilton opted to produce the privileged documents.  They relied 
on the fact that the Thompson family had adhered to the terms of 
the confidentiality agreement through the time of production and 
the Thompson's representation to the district court that Glenmede 
and Pepper Hamilton's concerns regarding public disclosure were 
unwarranted in light of the protection afforded by that 
  
agreement.11  The district court's subsequent denial of Glenmede 
and Pepper Hamilton's request for a protective order to enforce 
the umbrella of the confidentiality agreement stripped Glenmede 
and Pepper Hamilton of all means of appellate review, except this 
post-production mandamus petition, to remedy potential damage 
from the public disclosure of the Pepper Hamilton documents.12  
Hence, there are no other avenues of appellate review available 
to Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton to attempt to protect the 
privileged documents, which they produced in reliance on the 
confidentiality agreement, from widespread dissemination.  It is 
in recognition of these unique circumstances that we proceed to 
review whether there is a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ regarding both the protective order and the order compelling 
the production of the Pepper Hamilton files.  See Cipollone, 785 
F.2d at 1118.   
                     
11
.   We appreciate that our decision in Pansy, decided 
shortly after the production occurred, surprised many by our 
questioning the judicial endorsement of broad confidentiality 
agreements: 
 
 Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign 
orders which contain confidentiality clauses 
without considering the propriety of such 
orders, or the countervailing public 
interests which are sacrificed by the orders. 
 
23 F.3d at 785. 
12
.   The protective order sought by Glenmede and Pepper 
Hamilton and denied by the district court was to protect the 
umbrella of confidentiality established by the confidentiality 
agreement.  The district court has not ruled on the 
confidentiality of individual documents or categories of 
documents.  Thus, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton may still seek a 
protective order to maintain the confidentiality of specific 
categories of documents or individual documents.       
  
 
  III. 
 The district court's denial of Glenmede and Pepper 
Hamilton's request for a protective order was an exercise of the 
district court's discretion.  Mandamus is not available for abuse 
of discretion but we may exercise mandamus jurisdiction regarding 
the denial of a protective order if we find that the district 
court committed a clear error of law.  Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 
1118.  The district court applied Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994), and concluded that 
public policy considerations strongly militated against judicial 
sanctioning of the broad pre-Pansy confidentiality agreement 
proffered by the parties.  The district court did not commit a 
clear error of law requiring our issuing a writ of mandamus.   
 A party seeking a protective order over discovery 
materials must demonstrate that "good cause" exists for the 
protection of that material.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Pansy, 23 
F.3d at 786.  "Good cause" is established when it is specifically 
demonstrated that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and 
serious injury.  Id.  Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated 
by specific examples, however, will not suffice.  Id.  Glenmede 
and Pepper Hamilton bore the burden of establishing "good cause" 
to protect the umbrella of confidentiality established by the 
confidentiality agreement. 
 In Pansy, we recognized several factors, which are 
neither mandatory nor exhaustive, that may be considered in 
evaluating whether "good cause" exists: 
  
 1)  whether disclosure will violate any privacy 
interests; 
  
 2)  whether the information is being sought for a 
legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; 
 
 3)  whether disclosure of the information will cause a 
party embarrassment; 
 
 4)  whether confidentiality is being sought over 
information important to public health and safety; 
 
 5)  whether the sharing of information among litigants 
will promote fairness and efficiency; 
 
 6)  whether a party benefitting from the order of 
confidentiality is a public entity or official; 
and 
 
 7)  whether the case involves issues important to the 
public; 
 
23 F.3d at 787-91.  Although we have recognized that the district 
court is best situated to determine what factors are relevant to 
the dispute, we have cautioned that the analysis should always 
reflect a balancing of private versus public interests --  
 
 Discretion should be left with the court to 
evaluate the competing considerations in 
light of the facts of individual cases.  By 
focusing on the particular circumstances in 
the cases before them, courts are in the best 
position to prevent both the overly broad use 
of [confidentiality] orders and the 
unnecessary denial of confidentiality for 
information that deserves it . . . . 
Id. at 789 (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective 
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 
492 (1991)).     
 We recognize the distinguishable factual context of 
Pansy, from the facts of this appeal.  In Pansy, a newspaper 
  
sought access to a settlement agreement entered into between the 
Borough of Stroudsburg and its former police chief who had sued 
the Borough after being demoted and suspended for allegedly 
mishandling parking meter money.  23 F.3d at 776.  The public 
interest in Pansy was "particularly legitimate" given that one of 
the parties to the action was a public entity.  Id. at 786.  The 
public interest in access to information under freedom of 
information laws was the overriding factor that tipped the 
balance in favor of not granting a confidentiality order which 
would prevent disclosure pursuant to freedom of information laws.  
Id. at 791-92.  Here, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton assert that 
there is no legitimate public interest to be served by widespread 
dissemination of the Pepper Hamilton documents.  See Pansy, 23 
F.3d at 788 ("[I]f a case involves private litigants, and 
concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that 
should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining 
an order of confidentiality.").  They contend they will be harmed 
by the Thompson family's disclosure of the privileged documents 
to other Glenmede clients who were excluded from the transaction 
and to the media.  They are unable, however, to articulate any 
specific, cognizable injury from that dissemination.   
 Under Pansy, "[b]road allegations of harm, 
unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning" do 
not support a good cause showing.  Id. at 786.  Glenmede and 
Pepper Hamilton do not describe their harm other than in 
generalized allegations of injury to reputation and to 
relationships with clients.  For instance, Glenmede and Pepper 
  
Hamilton assert that the Thompsons' primary goal in reversing 
their position on confidentiality "is to publicize their 
allegations of a scheme between Glenmede and [Pepper Hamilton] in 
order to maximize the embarrassment and potential economic damage 
which such averments could generate to those institutions' 
relationships with their clients and the public."  Petition at 
30.  General allegations of injury to reputation and client 
relationships or embarrassment that may result from dissemination 
of privileged documents is insufficient to justify judicial 
endorsement of an umbrella confidentiality agreement.13  We have 
                     
13
.   Moreover, the record of this case compels us to deny 
the requested writ despite our recognition of the importance of 
protecting the attorney-client privilege.  See Haines v. Liggett 
Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).  We reiterate that 
the district court was never asked to perform an in camera 
inspection of any of the documents in conjunction with the 
request for protective order.  In fact, when the district court 
requested that the parties segregate the documents into separate 
categories for consideration of confidentiality, the parties were 
unable to agree.  Nor did Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton seek a 
protective order for specific documents that may prove harmful to 
their client relationships and/or reputations.  As the district 
court noted: 
 
 [Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton] do not seek a 
Confidentiality Order.  Rather they seek to 
protect the confidentiality agreement 
stipulated to by the parties.  An "umbrella" 
of confidentiality already exists, but now 
the defendants must show good cause for 
protecting that confidentiality agreement. 
 
December 2, 1994 Memorandum and Order at 5. 
 
 At oral argument, we questioned whether Glenmede and 
Pepper Hamilton may seek relief through an independent breach of 
contract action stemming from the Thompson family's public 
dissemination of the file documents.  (The only disclosure to 
date by the Thompson family of which we are aware was to aid the 
filing of a separate action by a similarly-situated plaintiff.)  
  
typically viewed the "embarrassment" factor in terms of non-
pecuniary harm to individuals; however, the primary measure of 
the well-being of a business is pecuniary.  See Cipollone, 785 
F.2d at 1121.  Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton have failed to 
sustain their burden of demonstrating they will sustain a 
specific injury from the public dissemination of the privileged 
documents sufficient to warrant the entry of an umbrella 
protective order.   
 In Pansy, we emphasized the strong public interest in 
open proceedings.  See 23 F.3d 772.  See also Miller v. Indiana 
Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) ("While we have recognized 
that there are certain delineated areas where openness is not the 
norm . . . [citations omitted], these cases are the exception.").  
The allegations lodged against Glenmede stemming from its 
involvement in the buy-back transaction impact the claims or 
potential claims of other Glenmede clients who were excluded from 
the transaction.  Federal courts should not provide a shield to 
potential claims by entering broad protective orders that prevent 
public disclosure of relevant information.  The sharing of 
information among current and potential litigants is furthered by 
open proceedings.  See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 ("Circumstances 
(..continued) 
Pepper Hamilton, however, conceded at oral argument that the 
Thompson family's challenge to the confidential designation 
affixed to the file documents comported with the literal terms of 
the agreement, if not with the spirit of the agreement.  The 
agreement contemplated challenges to the confidential designation 
of documents; however, neither Pepper Hamilton nor Glenmede 
anticipated a wholesale challenge to confidentiality of the 
Pepper Hamilton file. 
  
weighing against confidentiality exist when confidentiality is 
being sought over information important to public health and 
safety [citation omitted], and when the sharing of information 
among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency [citation 
omitted].").  Absent a showing that a defined and serious injury 
will result from open proceedings, a protective order should not 
issue.14  
 Despite Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton's arguments to the 
contrary, the district court was not required to enter a 
protective order merely to preserve for appellate review its 
determinations that an exception to the attorney-client privilege 
applied.  We have previously recognized the importance of 
preserving the right to appeal a determination that an exception 
to the attorney-client privilege applies prior to public 
disclosure of the privileged information.  In Haines we stated: 
    Because of the sensitivity surrounding the 
attorney-client privilege, care must be taken 
that, following any determination that an 
exception applies, the matters covered by the 
exception be kept under seal or appropriate 
court-imposed privacy procedures until all 
avenues of appeal are exhausted. 
 
975 F.2d at 97.  We did not intend, however, to establish a 
steadfast rule that protective orders must always issue to 
protect the privileged character of the materials sought in 
discovery until all avenues of appeal, including appeal from a 
                     
14
.   Because it is unnecessary to our decision, we do not 
comment as to whether Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton would succeed 
in obtaining a protective order regarding specific documents 
contained in the Pepper Hamilton file. 
 
  
final judgment, are exhausted.  Requiring the issuance of a 
protective order in all circumstances where a district court has 
determined that an exception to the attorney-client privilege 
applies thwarts our policy of open proceedings absent a showing 
of good cause to close them.  See Pansy, 23 F.3d 772; Miller, 16 
F.3d 549.  Such a rule would be tantamount to permitting the 
parties to control the use of protective orders.15  This is 
especially evident where, as here, the party asserting the 
privilege chooses to forego, until final judgment, appellate 
review of the district court's determination that an exception to 
the attorney-client privilege applies.   
 The unique evolution of events in this case, however, 
bids us to review the district court's determination as to the 
scope of Glenmede's waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  We 
recognize that the district court's denial of the protective 
order subsequent to the production of the Pepper Hamilton file 
                     
15
.   On March 14, 1995, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States rejected a proposed amendment to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(c) that provides in part that:  "the court . . 
. may, for good cause shown or on stipulation of the parties, 
make any order that justice requires to protect a party or person 
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense. . . ."  (Emphasis in original).  In addition, the 
proposed rule would add a new section 26(c)(3) that provides a 
means for modification or dissolution of a protective order on 
motion of a party, a person bound by it or a person who has been 
permitted to intervene to seek modification or dissolution.  The 
Judicial Conference recommitted the proposed amendments to Rule 
26(c) to the Rules Committee for further study.  Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Report Judicial 
Conference Actions, March 14, 1995; Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Report of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, December 13, 
1994. 
  
jeopardized Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton's ability to remedy on 
appeal from final judgment the harm, if any, they may suffer as a 
result of the public dissemination of the privileged materials.  
This turn of events places Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton in the 
unfortunate and unforeseeable position of seeking post-production 
mandamus relief from the disclosure of privileged information.   
 
 IV. 
 The attorney-client privilege16 may be waived by a 
client who asserts reliance on the advice of counsel as an 
affirmative defense.  See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 32 F.3d at 863.  
Under such circumstances, the client has made a conscious 
decision to inject the advice of counsel as an issue in the 
litigation.  Id.  Although we recognized these propositions in 
                     
16
.   Communications that may be protected from disclosure 
during discovery because of the attorney-client privilege possess 
the following characteristics: 
 
  (1) the asserted holder of the privilege 
is or sought to become a client; (2) the 
person to whom the communication was made (a) 
is a member of the bar of a court, or his or 
her subordinate, and (b) in connection with 
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) 
the communication relates to a fact of which 
the attorney was informed (a) by his client 
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for 
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) 
an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or 
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, 
and (d) not for the purpose of committing a 
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been 
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 
 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
  
Rhone-Poulenc, our holding in that case -- that a party does not 
lose the privilege to protect attorney-client communications from 
disclosure in discovery when his or her state of mind is placed 
at issue -- was premised upon the unique facts of that case.  32 
F.3d 864.  In Rhone-Poulenc, advice of counsel was not raised as 
an affirmative defense nor were there any acts evincing a clear 
intent to waive the attorney-client privilege by placing at issue 
reliance on the advice of counsel.  Here, Glenmede raised 
reliance on the advice of counsel regarding what parties should 
be included in the buy-back transaction as an affirmative defense 
to the Thompson family's claims and voluntarily produced the 
Opinion Letter and a draft of it in response to discovery 
requests.   
 Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton concede that Glenmede 
waived the attorney-client privilege regarding the Opinion Letter 
and any communications between itself and Pepper Hamilton 
pertaining to that letter.  They object, however, to the district 
court's conclusion that Glenmede's waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege encompassed the entire buy-back transaction, including 
internal Pepper Hamilton back-up documents to the Opinion Letter 
that were never communicated to Glenmede.  They submit that it 
was clear error for the district court to expand the waiver 
beyond the confines of the issue addressed in the Opinion Letter 
to all communications, whether written or oral, to or from 
counsel concerning the buy-back transaction.17  
                     
17
.   We note that Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton base their 
argument for our finding a limited waiver of the attorney-client 
  
 There is an inherent risk in permitting the party 
asserting a defense of its reliance on advice of counsel to 
define the parameters of the waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege as to that advice.  That party should not be permitted 
to define selectively the subject matter of the advice of counsel 
on which it relied in order to limit the scope of the waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege and therefore the scope of 
discovery.  To do so would undermine the very purpose behind the 
exception to the attorney-client privilege at issue here -- 
fairness.   
 The party opposing the defense of reliance on advice of 
counsel must be able to test what information had been conveyed 
by the client to counsel and vice-versa regarding that advice --  
whether counsel was provided with all material facts in rendering 
their advice, whether counsel gave a well-informed opinion and 
whether that advice was heeded by the client.  See In re ML-Lee 
Acquisition Fund II, L.P., 859 F. Supp. 765, 767 (1994).  Here, 
the advice that Glenmede placed at issue related to the structure 
of the transaction -- the identity of the parties and how many of 
their shares would be repurchased by Oryx.  In fact, the Opinion 
Letter indicates that Glenmede requested advice "concerning the 
inclusion of certain private trusts and estates in transactions."  
(..continued) 
privilege exclusively on the confines of the attorney-client 
privilege; they do not rely on the separate attorney work product 
doctrine to prevent the disclosure of Pepper Hamilton's internal 
file documents.  See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984). 
  
Testing the advice of counsel defense regarding why only the Pew 
Charitable Trusts were included in the transaction necessarily 
encompasses, as Glenmede acknowledges, more than tax advice.  We 
agree with the district court that Glenmede waived the attorney-
client privilege as to all communications, both written and oral, 
to or from counsel as to the entire transaction.   
 We also agree that Glenmede's waiver encompasses the 
back-up documents to the Opinion Letter, which include Pepper 
Hamilton's internal research and other file memoranda.18  A 
review of these internal documents may lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence regarding what information had been conveyed 
to Glenmede about the structure of the buy-back transaction and 
the advice of counsel in that regard.  Because it is unnecessary 
to our holding, we do not determine whether such documents are 
relevant for any purpose other than the fact that they may lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence.19                    
 
 V. 
                     
18
.   We again note that Pepper Hamilton has not asserted 
that these internal file memoranda are protected by the work 
product doctrine, which would have required a different analysis 
by the district court.   
19
.   We again note that Pepper Hamilton and Glenmede may 
possess other means to protect the confidentiality of some of 
these internal documents.  They have never sought a protective 
order respecting specific internal memoranda that, though 
relevant for discovery purposes, may reveal information, such as 
clients of Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton or financial information 
not relevant to the dispute, that is not of public import.   
  
 We also deny Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton's request for 
a writ sealing district court opinions and a hearing transcript 
and removing all opinions and pleadings referencing the Pepper 
Hamilton documents from public access.  As we have previously 
recognized, the right of access to judicial records is beyond 
dispute.  See Miller, 16 F.3d at 551; Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied 
Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1993).  As we 
held above, we find that the district court did not err in its 
rulings as to the scope of Glenmede's waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and the denial of a protective order requesting 
an umbrella of confidentiality for the Pepper Hamilton documents.  
Thus, we must also deny Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton's request 
for mandamus relief from the dissemination of the Pepper Hamilton 
file documents through public access to judicial records. 
 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the requested 
writs of mandamus. 
     
_________________________ 
